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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the changing strategies of developmental 
states using Brazil’s oil-based industrial policy as a case study. We 
analyse the relationship between the state, Petrobras and industrial 
elites in the context of Brazil’s renewed emphasis on sector-specific 
industrial development strategy. Taking stock and re-examining the 
developmental state model, we suggest that developmental states are 
inherently political, particularly their bureaucracy and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and that money politics is intricately woven into 
state-guided high growth regimes. Given the difficulty of privatisation 
as a solution to SOE (mis)governance, the challenge for Brazil is to 
mediate extreme political interventions that have eroded Petrobras’ 
autonomy in the past and to sustain institutional capacity to direct 
rents towards investment and innovation.
Introduction
Petrobras was a victim of the [Lava Jato] criminal scheme – in not one moment was it a beneficiary.
Pedro Parente, Petrobras CEO1
The Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal that embroiled Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled energy 
firm, into the centre of political corruption marked the gradual unravelling of state interven-
tionist policies in Brazil. What became a crisis of Brazilian state capitalism has tentatively put 
an end to Lula da Silva and his Workers’ Party (PT) deepening of state capitalism as a devel-
opment strategy. As the crisis deepened, and more politicians, state bureaucrats and private 
companies become implicated by the investigation, questions have arisen whether Brazil’s 
developmental state has turned into predatory capitalism. These moments of crises are inter-
esting times, which compel scholars and policy-makers to partake their assessments over 
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the policies, politics and institutions that generate successful industrial policy, and the asso-
ciated costs that have to be borne with as an outcome of these development strategies.
In this context, our paper takes a step back to assess what state capitalism entails from a 
sectoral perspective. In evaluating Brazil’s developmental state model and its effectiveness 
in managing economic globalisation, we focus on the PT government’s attempts at crafting 
sectoral linkages and reviving the capital goods industries through the oil and gas (O&G) 
sector – a strategy reflective of some familiar instruments characterising the state-led high 
growth regimes of East Asia. It is undoubtedly the case that Brazil’s model of development 
centred on state intervention, achieving key features of Northeast Asian developmental states. 
However, in contrast to Northeast Asia, Brazil lacked the coherence and social cohesion found 
in classic developmental states and failed to promote an overall re-orientation of the economy 
towards high value-added manufacturing.2 For these reasons, Schneider suggests that Brazil’s 
economic performance as a developmental state is medium, at best, since the country’s 
political elites are coherent in terms of ideology and political intent (or developmental role) 
as well as capacity to direct policies (or developmental structures), leading to several successes 
in creating competitive sectors, such as in aerospace and O&G. However, the state falls short 
in terms of sustaining industrial growth and in creating innovation systems.3
Our substantive contribution to this special issue rests on advancing a critical appraisal of 
the successes and shortcomings of Brazil’s sectoral policies as a means to promote industrial 
growth. Our argument is as follows. Firstly, we claim that developmental states are motivated 
by political as opposed to economic rationale in pursuit of state-guided high growth regimes. 
Hence, the unravelling of Brazil’s developmental strategy is partly a consequence of how 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are intrinsically embedded in political interventions by 
national elites, leading to constrained choices over an SOE’s ability to make productive invest-
ments that would lead to innovation and competitiveness in the economy. Secondly, by 
focussing on the O&G sector as a case study, our paper argues that developmental states can 
design resource-intensive development strategies provided that a clear vision exists as regards 
how the national government will meet the high capital requirements and intensive techno-
logical innovation systems necessary to push for structural transformation through natural 
resources. Historically, the O&G industry is subject to heavy state regulation and characterised 
by state ownership through public enterprises. In Brazil, Petrobras played a central role in 
sectoral development and, through its particular relationship with the government, grew to 
become a major global energy player. Hence, the O&G sector is today one of the main drivers 
of the Brazilian economy; its contribution to national GDP increased substantially from 3% 
in 2000 to 13% in 2014.4 Echoing Ovadia and Wolf in this volume, scholars need to look beyond 
traditional sectors if we are to seek for emerging developmental strategies outside of the East 
Asian region. Brazil is an exemplar of a developmental state that has successfully industrialised 
in the recent past, but is also attempting to make important strides to seek new comparative 
advantages and promote alternative ways of doing industrial policy. Our paper, then, offers 
an initial evaluation as regards the gains and shortcomings of its strategy.
What we know about developmental states
The idea of government intervention in developing countries has a long intellectual history 
that privileged the state as the prime entrepreneur in the context of uneven development.5 
However, the necessary empirical evidence supporting the viability of state intervention did 
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not come until the successful industrialisation of East Asian countries. The concept of the 
‘developmental state’ emerged, and became ‘a shorthand for the seamless web of political, 
bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structure economic life in capitalist Northeast 
Asia’.6 But as global market integration narrows the spaces for national industrialisation, the 
purpose and significance of state action in directing growth-enhancing sectors in a new 
international context requires asking what sort of intervention enhances productivity and 
generates structural transformation, how this intervention occurs and for what purpose.7
Historically, states have intervened in many ways to initiate economic development. In 
order to enhance productivity and initiate structural transformation, states used a variety 
of direct and indirect instruments. Such instruments ranged from subsidies, tariffs, incentives 
and direct credit to monetary policies, to name a few.8 Driven by the need and intent to 
industrialise, they sought to expand the size of their domestic markets through political 
centralisation, creation of domestic demand through backward linkages and improvement 
in labour productivity and supply by removing barriers to mobility as well as development 
of human capital.9 These policy objectives were achieved through the mobilisation of 
resources aimed at promoting the import and adaptation of foreign technology. In other 
words, states implemented a series of interdependent policies aimed at responding to the 
multiple bottlenecks of late development.
In the literature on developmental states, there are three important elements that have 
been identified as necessary preconditions for successful industrialisation: (1) a high degree of 
administrative capacity of the professional bureaucracy – or state capacity (developmental 
structures) – combined with relative political autonomy from rent-seeking interests to carry 
out a development programme; (2) the presence of a developmental vision or guiding ideology 
that proffers coherence in policy paradigm (developmental role);10 and (3) the presence of a 
governing coalition between states and industrial elites bound by discipline and mutual inter-
dependence – a relationship that is crucial for the exchange of information, effective policy 
implementation and the creation of a shared developmental vision.11 In contrast to the regu-
latory state often associated with Anglo-Saxon capitalism, where bureaucratic administrative 
capacity is focussed on rules and procedures, the bureaucracy in developmental states uses 
administrative discretion to establish economic goals and set targets – in other words, guide 
business through a number of instruments, such as preferential credit and subsidies.12
However, the DS literature has oftentimes come across as almost prescriptive and have 
been criticised for having unrealistic expectations about the actual workings of states outside 
East Asia.13 In exploring the case study of Brazil, we highlight some of the assumptions of the 
theory that require further elaboration. Even when states bear the key characteristics that 
constitute a developmental state, the nature of domestic political coalitions and the historical 
conditions that shaped national firms and their relationship with governments co-vary across 
space and time. For example, South Korea is more successful than Taiwan and Singapore in 
mobilising financial resources for industrialisation because the Korean state was more disci-
plined with capital and labour.14 Conversely, in the case of Brazil, the developmental state is 
not as cohesive as its East Asian counterparts and, given its economic size and territorial 
space, is historically fraught with political challenges of state centralisation.15
Brazil and a reappraisal of the developmental state 
We draw out three elements of the theory to explain the changing Brazilian DS model. Firstly, 
we emphasise the political nature of state-building. Although ‘pockets of state efficiency’ 
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and insulated bureaucrats were fundamental in crafting cohesive development plans, such 
bureaucracies are neither truly depoliticised nor completely technocratic. In Japan, MITI’s 
bureaucratic autonomy was constrained and its decisions often followed the electoral strat-
egy of the ruling party; in Taiwan, in turn, party bosses often shifted bureaucrats across top 
government agencies and ministries.16 While bureaucratic selection in East Asian develop-
mental states was based on merit, promotions were based on seniority and performance 
was assessed according to rule compliance.17 For Haggard, it is ‘misleading to think that 
bureaucrats enjoyed independence’ in East Asian authoritarian regimes. Instead, bureaucra-
cies are rightly ‘interpreted as instruments of authoritarian rulers, reformed not to ensure 
their independence but to assure their loyalty to the leadership’.18 The point is not that 
bureaucracies in East Asian developmental states were never autonomous and insulated; 
instead, bureaucracies are not completely depoliticised as direction, vision and political will 
are generated outside.19 Hence, when we examine Brazil and its network of technocrats 
found in the ministries, government agencies and SOEs, we need to be aware that their 
autonomy is bounded within a state rationale guided by party politics, developmentalist 
visions and competing political objectives. The technocratic capacity of bureaucrats to design 
and implement industrial planning is, therefore, a necessary but insufficient condition in 
producing public goods, such as sound macro-economic management and pro-business 
policies.
Secondly, state–business relations are typically understood as the alliance between pol-
iticians, bureaucrats and industrial elites. Through the creation of intermediary institutions 
and informal channels, developmental states provide the platform to facilitate exchange of 
information, implement policies that support business interests and create a shared devel-
opmental vision between economic and political elites. Bearing this in mind, links to society 
and informal and formal networks were established to create a stable channel of commu-
nication and information exchanges between private and public sectors. For example, in 
Japan, upon retirement bureaucrats took employment in the private sector.20 The same 
practice can be found in South Korea and Taiwan. These permeable ties between the public 
and private are constitutive of the process of embedding states within societies. Thus, the 
foundation of successful developmental states lies on the capacity of states to discipline 
businesses as well as on an alliance between state and businesses – or what Johnson refers 
as a ‘consensus’ between industrialists and policy elites.21 This agreement, or developmental 
coalition, is more than a generic relationship between states and social forces. In Evans’ term, 
it is the reconstitution of state agents and business actors in a relationship built upon the 
‘embedded autonomy’ of the state.22
Yet another way of understanding East Asian state–business relations is through the lens 
of crony capitalism, wherein state–business alliance is about how money, corruption and 
rent-seeking were controlled by and through state institutions. Johnson admitted the exist-
ence of extensive ‘structural corruption’ (kozo oshoku) in the Japanese model, in which pol-
iticians receive funds from people seeking favours and that they have obligations to respond 
to these requests.23 While some have dismissed this as an ‘Asian way’ of doing business, 
political corruption is integral to decision-making and was, in fact, a precondition for rapid 
growth in East Asia.24 Prior to initiating the macroeconomic policy regimes associated with 
rapid growth, the conservative leaders in Japan and South Korea had to find ways to deal 
with potentially paralysing political battles within the right wing while the ruling Kuomintang 
(KMT) in Taiwan faced a potentially serious threat from an increasingly alienated majority, 
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many of whom did not fully accept the KMT as a legitimate government. As Wederman sums 
up, the right turned to machine politics to create stable ruling coalitions, which enabled the 
bureaucracy to implement an industrial policy that transferred rents from state coffers to 
the private sector. Politicians served to buffer the technocrats from society and elections 
became the mechanism to buy-in political support through a network of local politicians 
and business actors. On the one hand, businesses offered financial resources in order for 
conservative political leaders to build stable coalitions by ‘binding together what would 
otherwise have been a series of rival and often hostile factions’.25 On the other hand, gov-
ernment control and policy stability provided the ruling coalition with the capacity to harness 
state policies aimed at repaying the ‘big bosses’ in chaebols and keiretsu while also investing 
on public and private goods.26 To put it simply, state–business alliance is effectively a stable, 
recurring system of redistribution between public and private channels, which meets the 
mutual obligations of business and the state, leading to a political coalition able to forge a 
developmental vision and deliver these objectives through developmental structures within 
the state apparatus.
However, not all close relations between states and businesses lead to positive outcomes; 
depending on the context, they may degenerate into particularistic predation.27 An unbal-
anced relationship may result in penetration and capture, as in the Philippines, or loss of 
state effectiveness, as in Korea, where reforms led to the fragmentation of the state and 
strengthening of business groups.28 In the context of Evan’s intermediate states, of which 
Brazil and India are examples, an unbalanced relationship could lead to clientelism, ‘inability 
to construct joint projects with potential industrial elites’ or inconsistency, as ‘joint projects 
may be possible in certain sectors or certain periods but degenerate into clientelism or 
isolated autonomy in other sectors or other periods’.29 The key, as Kang outlines, is a rela-
tionship built on a coherent state and concentrated business (‘mutual hostages’), as opposed 
to dispersed business groups, which would compete for rents, or a fractured state that is 
incapable of disciplining the industrial elites.30 In other words, only when neither the state 
nor business can overpower each other would a developmental alliance work and lead to 
industrial growth.
Finally, as Nem Singh and Chen argue, state ownership particularly in strategic industries 
has been relatively undertheorised in relation to the workings of the developmental state. 
Most DS scholarship focusses on the balance between the state and privately-owned busi-
nesses in terms of building an autonomous and equal partnership as the micro-foundation 
of state-guided high-growth system.31 However, catching up in the industrialisation race is 
not a homogeneous or linear process; instead it is a process involving some segments of the 
economy through specific sectors to harness spill-over effects beyond the industry as well 
as to establish consumption, fiscal and production linkages over time.32 The capacity to 
deliver rapid growth and move into higher value-added activities are not inevitable pro-
cesses. Both require institutional coordination and state planning and, historically, this was 
achieved by developmental states through SOEs. In fact, political leaders in East Asia partially 
relied on state ownership as a means to maximise rents in strategic sectors, either through 
monopoly or through control over assets via state-backed financing.33 However, certain 
states, such as Brazil and China, are far more reliant on SOEs for the development of strategic 
industries. Throughout Brazil’s developmental history, investment in strategic industries was 
mostly done through direct investments by SOEs or state-owned banks.34 In the next section, 
we examine Brazil’s DS model, its highly politicised nature and the place of state-owned 
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companies in strategic industries as political elites push for new methods of gaining com-
parative advantage in the new global economy.
Brazil’s oil-based industrial policy, 2003–2016
The O&G industry is of critical importance to the Brazilian economy. In addition to its strategic 
importance, the discovery of pre-salt oil reserves off the coastline of Rio de Janeiro by 
Petrobras was momentous for the country. To start, the discovery reflected the raison d’être 
of Petrobras since 1952: to find oil reserves and reduce Brazil’s energy dependence. When 
the PT government came to power, the O&G industry became the focal point of a new 
development strategy aimed at promoting technological innovation within the O&G supply 
chain while building sectoral linkages. This strategy became possible only through the inte-
gral role of Petrobras in the transformation of the sector. The state enterprise held a monop-
oly for 45 years and slowly developed the supply chain. Along the way, the SOE found its 
niche in deep-sea exploration and production technology. Petrobras developed its extensive 
knowledge of the domestic market, geological expertise of Brazilian onshore and offshore 
reserves and, through the import substitution (IS) model, had direct political influence in 
shaping O&G policy. This was consequential to Petrobras’ high levels of independence from 
the state, which meant the firm became ‘a state within a state’.35
However, the changes towards more open markets in the world economy made it hard 
for policy elites to sustain the developmental state model.36 Typical policy instruments, such 
as subsidies, tax rebates and protectionism, were slowly abandoned during the 1990s. In 
the O&G industry, the role of the Brazilian state shifted from direct producer with monopoly 
control towards a regulator. The Cardoso government (1995–2003) argued that private invest-
ment was crucial to bring economic dynamism to the sector. The 1997 Petroleum Law was 
then passed, with the principal objective of introducing market competition and breaking 
the state’s monopoly. Through the establishment of a regulatory agency, the National Agency 
of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), Cardoso sought to break tradition from the 
DS model and the political power of Petrobras.37 Yet amidst major changes in Brazil’s petro-
leum law, Petrobras has remained the dominant player, exercising control across different 
segments of the market (see Table 1).
While sectoral policy under Cardoso aimed to introduce private investment in the O&G 
industry, Lula da Silva (2003–2011) sought to deepen state capitalism, particularly during 
his second term. To this end, he sought approval of a new legislation, which was realised 
upon the passage of Law 12.351/2010. The law altered the nature of contracts in the Brazilian 
O&G sector from a concession contract towards a production-sharing arrangement. Under 
this new institutional design, the state retains subsoil rights while it also permits private 
firms to operate in the development of oil fields as service contractors. The Brazilian state 
reaps the high rewards, as risks of non-discovery in the oilfields are low. The legislation also 
established a 30% minimum participation share-rule reserved for Petrobras; consortia and 
joint ventures with international oil companies (IOCs) were allowed under the rules of the 
1997 Petroleum Law.
Broadly speaking, da Silva’s oil regulatory framework was an attempt at re-industrialisa-
tion, which coalesced around state intervention to strategically guide national industrial 
growth. There were two key components in this approach: first, heavy state investment in 
infrastructure in oil and related sectors to generate new demand in the domestic market; 
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and second, the utilisation of local content requirements to consolidate a local supply-chain 
while fostering linkages between oil and the wider economy. Lula da Silva sought to take 
advantage of Petrobras’ technological advantage in offshore drilling technology by investing 
heavily in the O&G sector.38 In 2007, the government aggressively earmarked funding for 
infrastructure projects with the objective of creating jobs through public spending. At the 
back of windfall profits from a commodity boom, da Silva launched a two-phase major 
infrastructure programme – the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). An initial US$349 billion 
(2007–2010) was invested through PAC 1, followed by PAC 2 with an estimated spending of 
US$526 billion between 2011 and 2014.39 Public expenditure rose from 0.5% in the 1990s 
to 5% of the GDP in 2007–2010.40 Investment under PAC was divided into three categories: 
(a) logistical infrastructure; (b) energy infrastructure, which includes generation and trans-
mission of electricity, as well as the production, exploration and shipping of petroleum, 
natural gas and renewable fuels; and (c) social and urban infrastructure.41 The energy infra-
structure projects were concentrated in O&G aimed at exploring the pre-salt oilfields, to 
which the direct beneficiary was Petrobras.
The second aspect of the government’s sectoral policy was focussed on local content 
requirements. Although it is often assumed that a radical break towards a new form of 
developmentalism was achieved under Lula da Silva, oil policy is an example of institutional 
continuity. Although Cardoso de-emphasised industrial policy, seeking to promote macro-
economic stability, privatisation and deregulation, several of his policies might be considered 
as de facto sector-specific industrial policies. An example of this approach is the establish-
ment of local content (LC) rules and the procurement policy under the ANP in 1999.
Through local content rules, the Brazilian state sought to expand the capacity of the 
domestic supply chain.42 This approach to sectoral development is intimately linked to the 
evolution of Petrobras. The company has a long history of supporting domestic suppliers. 
During the IS period, its policy of favouring domestic producers was strategically used to 
develop the capital goods sector. Petrobras successfully created a network of local suppliers, 
as it worked in enhancing the quality standards of inputs of Brazilian firms into the supply 
chain. Local content policies were widely used and Petrobras’ purchases peaked at 80% in 
the 1980s. However, local content dropped substantially, falling to about 40% during the 
1990s. The policy was then re-established in response to growing business concerns regard-
ing the competitiveness and capacity of the domestic industry to meet the challenges of an 
open economy. Since 1999, companies taking part in O&G exploration are required to acquire 
local goods and services. Contracts signed between the ANP and oil firms also required that 
firms give preference to Brazilian suppliers in cases where prices, quality, and delivery were 
equivalent to those of international suppliers.43
Table 1. Petroleum and natural gas production in Brazil by operator, 2015.
Note: aNP, ANP Annuário 2016, 82 (adapted).
  Petroleum (in Barrels) Natural Gas (in Cubic Millimetres)  
ToTal 889,667,381 35,126,447
Petrobras  822,051,381.5 92% 33,115,158.6 94%
Statoil Brasil  26,459,293.4 3% 36,773.1 0%
Shell Brasil  23,460,667.4 3% 265,679.3 1%
Chevron Frade  8,500,306.9 1% 92,041.3 0%
oGX  4,900,627.0 1% 15,407 0%
others  4,295,104.8 0% 1,601,387.7 5%
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Under Cardoso, there was no minimum or maximum levels of local content; during da 
Silva’s government, LC became obligatory. In 2003, the government imposed a minimum 
share. In 2005, the ANP introduced a measure of local content, which established a minimum 
and a maximum level and a certification process through an independent organisation 
accredited by the regulatory agency. The results were apparent (see Table 2); the average of 
LC increased from 33.5% in exploration and 42.25% in development phases in the first four 
rounds to 79.6% and 85.3% respectively in the following bid rounds.
The PT government saw the potential to use local inputs as a way to hasten the develop-
ment of the local supply chain and develop linkages between the O&G sector and other 
productive sectors of the economy. The strategy, therefore, was to consolidate and further 
the vertical integration of the O&G supply chain in Brazil, using Petrobras as the main driver. 
Given the size of Petrobras and the importance and contribution of the oil sector to domestic 
GDP, the establishment of a procurement policy, which gives priority to domestic suppliers, 
has the potential to significantly impact the supply chain and productive structure of the 
Brazilian industry. For instance, in the pre-salt area, Petrobras alone was expected to invest 
US$128 billion in exploration and production between 2012 and 2015.44 In 2014, the gov-
ernment further estimated that until 2020, US$400 billion would be invested in equipment, 
services, maintenance and production expansion.45 This would, in theory, facilitate an 
increase in domestic demand of machinery and equipment, trade and services, as well as 
oil tankers, support ships and marine services.
The pre-salt exploration and expansion of the O&G industry also opened the possibility 
for sectoral linkages. An effect of the 1997 Petroleum Law was the revitalisation of the ship-
building industry. In the 1970s, Brazil’s shipbuilding industry ranked among the largest in 
the world. Since the late 1970s, however, the industry experienced a drastic decline.46 At the 
height of liberalisation, the industry decline was intensified as domestic shipyards were 
exposed to increased global competition. Unable to compete, most firms went bankrupt 
and employment fell from over 39,000 in 1979 to only 1880 in 1998.47
The 1997 Petroleum Law enabled competition (although limited), which in turn yielded 
to gradual recovery in outputs, and brought forth new demands for drill rigs, support vessels 
and marine services. The industry was further boosted by Petrobras’ programme of mod-
ernisation and expansion of its fleet (PROMEF). Part of PAC, the programme called for invest-
ment in support vessels, platforms and related services that were expected to reach R$135 
billion (approximately US$41.5 billion at current exchange rates) until 2020.48 In other words, 
Petrobras was fundamental to the recovery of the shipbuilding industry by retaining its role 
as the largest contractor of vessels and marine support services in the country. In terms of 
investment, Petrobras, through its subsidiary Transpetro, shored up purchases and volume 
of orders that reached up to 80% of sectoral investment.49
The local content policy was further extended to the sector and used as the main instru-
ment for the development of local suppliers. The basic rules for local content were no differ-
ent in the shipbuilding sector as shipbuilders, equipment manufacturers and service 
providers were required to fulfil LC requirements. According to SINAVAL – the organisation 
that represents Brazilian shipyards – in 2011, the local industry aimed to supply over 70% 
of the inputs required for the construction of tankers and over 64% of the inputs for FPSOs.50 
Petrobras demand for new vessels was expected to assure work in Brazilian shipyards up to 
2020.51 As a result of the LC policy and incentives to revitalise the shipbuilding industry, 
employment in the sector increased significantly – reaching over 82,000 in 201452 – as 
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investment, mostly from Petrobras, in upstream segments of the pre-salt area fuelled new 
demands for ships. However, despite these positive results, there were important shortcom-
ings in the design of PT’s sectoral policy, which hindered the effectiveness of the strategy. 
These are discussed in detail below.
The decline of state-guided growth regimes: Brazil amidst a crisis 
During the period marked by the commodity boom, Brazil experienced decent growth rates, 
an expansion of the middle classes and subsequent increase in consumption and a return 
to an interventionist state. However, flaws in policy design and the exacerbation of politici-
sation that consolidated a state-managed rent-seeking system have contributed to what is 
now a political and economic crisis. In this section, we examine the factors that contributed 
to the failure of state intervention as a development strategy in Brazil.
Inherent flaws in institutional design of the Brazilian DS
State intervention is an expensive, highly politicised process that requires cohesiveness both 
in developmental vision and structures. Therefore, any state intervention must be justified 
by the objectives of the economic and development policy. The Brazilian LC policy, however, 
lacked strategic direction. It failed to take into consideration long-term goals, namely val-
ue-creation and diversification of the economy. From the beginning, the ‘policy’s general 
objectives were quickly imposed without focused targets’ or ‘advanced metrics or indicators 
that could accurately measure its results’.53 There was no consideration of which segments 
of the domestic industry had better chances of competing internationally and, therefore, 
could benefit most of extended protection. It also failed to appreciate the realities and actual 
production capacity of the domestic industry.54 By establishing high local content require-
ments, it created a demand for equipment and services beyond the supply’s chain production 
capacity. Investments in the Brazilian O&G sector increased rapidly, from US$10 billion in 
2006 to US$40 billion in 2013. Domestic firms did not have the time and capabilities to adjust 
to the sudden growth, since to fill the demand of the industry would require substantial 
investments.55 The LC requirements became impossible to achieve, which then led to delays, 
fines and higher prices. In 2013, Petrobras complained to ANP that the local industry could 
not meet LC requirements to proceed with exploration and development of oil fields auc-
tioned in Round 11. It also announced that it was moving the work on the conversion of four 
tankers into FPSOs to China because Brazilian shipyards could not keep up with the required 
construction schedules.56 Crucially, the lack of international competitiveness of the domestic 
industry became manifest as prices of domestically produced equipment could be nearly 
70% more expensive than its foreign competitors.57 In other words, domestic content became 
costly and highly controversial.
The policy further failed to properly consider the capacity of the regulatory agency to 
monitor the sector. The ANP as a regulatory agency did not have sufficient capacity to enforce 
the rules given the complexity of the O&G industry and of the LC rules. In an audit carried 
out in 2012, the Federal Court of Auditors (TCU) concluded that the ANP lacked the structure 
to adequately supervise the industry. According to the report, the ANP’s inspection and 
monitoring system were flawed since it relied solely on information declared by companies.58 
With the change in the methodology for measuring LC requirements and the adoption of 
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the certification system in 2005, third-party evaluation was established as a requirement. 
This, in turn, introduced new activities which resulted in accumulation of tasks and limited 
the agency’s coordination capacity and performance.59
In addition, the institutional gridlock between ministries coordinating the sectoral policy 
is also an indication of the weakening state cohesion in Brazil. While the Ministry for Mines 
and Energy (MME) and ANP are jointly responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of sectoral policy, these agencies were unable to design a cohesive sectoral approach given 
their distinctive institutional rationale, objectives and regulatory functions. Unlike in the 
past, where Petrobras controlled the needs and demands of the sector due to its monopoly 
position, the ANP faced technocratic deficits to monitor and make Petrobras compliant – a 
company that trained and hired professional oil engineers and geologists over the past 45 
years.60 As the first ANP Director, David Zylberstajn, puts it, ‘the challenge for ANP was to 
establish itself as a credible regulatory body that can effectively conduct social, environ-
mental, and commercial audits to promote fair competition in the sector’.61
Building developmental capacity and technocratic expertise in the O&G sector was chal-
lenging in a developmental state model where regulatory bodies do not have similar logics 
of administrative functions compared to the Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalist model. In Brazil, 
both ANP and MME did not have the time to develop contacts with their domestic suppliers. 
Thus, the state had limited understanding and capability to formulate policies that directly 
responded to the problems and concerns of the industry.62 By contrast, Petrobras’ developed 
the local supply chain during the IS period through its capacity to transfer information 
between the market and the state. Furthermore, a key feature of the Brazilian DS model is 
the reliance on SOEs in promoting its industrial policy. The cornerstone of PT’s oil-led strategy 
assumed that Petrobras would drive both the demands for heavy capital goods and tech-
nological learning in the sector. While such dependence worked for Brazil during the IS 
period, similar approach failed as Petrobras became politicised and the target of a grand 
rent-seeking scheme.
The creation of a state-managed rent-seeking system
Perhaps what hastened the decline of the state-guided growth regime in Brazil is the extreme 
politicisation of the bureaucracy combined with the consolidation of rent-seeking centralised 
around the PT government. The Car Wash (Lava Jato) scandal is the most evident example 
of how extensive structural corruption has led to the weakening of the Brazilian state’s 
developmental capacity. Petrobras became entrenched in a rent-seeking scheme that 
involved millions of dollars in kickbacks to officials of the SOE, high-level bureaucrats and 
elected politicians, particularly members of the ruling PT government. The scheme lasted 
for at least a decade and was aimed at defrauding Petrobras on contracts upon the discovery 
of pre-salt oilfields. Contractors organised a cartel and paid bribes to Petrobras senior exec-
utives, segments of the bureaucracy and elected politicians. A criminal conspiracy was organ-
ised and run from within Petrobras after 2003 – a period when former president Dilma 
Rousseff was Minister for Mines and Energy and chairman of the company’s board of directors 
as well as chief of staff of Lula da Silva’s government. According to the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (MPF), the prices in the contracts offered to Petrobras were calculated and adjusted 
in secret meetings.63 These meetings served for the contractors to agree beforehand which 
company would win the contract and at what price. Consequently, bribes, which varied from 
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1% to 5% of the total amount of contracts, were then distributed through financial agents 
in order to ensure that transactions would go through the state apparatus.64 Among the 
directly implicated in the scandal are the CEOs and senior executives of major construction 
companies, such as Odebrecht Group, OAS, Queiroz Galvão, Andrade Gutierrez SA and 
Camargo Corrêa.65
The damage of the scandal is particularly evident in Petrobras, which quickly eroded its 
reputation as a highly professional and autonomous state enterprise. Those involved sought 
to ensure that only members of the cartel would be invited to bid on projects. To do so, 
Petrobras’ employees were co-opted, who then restricted the participation of outsiders, 
negotiated unnecessary additions to contracts, raised prices at excessive rates and leaked 
relevant information to favoured bidders.
The scheme, however, goes beyond Petrobras and extends to the wider political system. 
A second pillar of the Car Wash scheme was the involvement of financial operators who 
became responsible not only for intermediating the payment of bribes, but also for laun-
dering and distributing the money to key beneficiaries in the legislature and executive 
branches. In 2015, the Attorney General of the Republic presented to the Federal Supreme 
Court 28 petitions for the opening of criminal investigations on 55 people, 49 of which were 
holders of foro privilegiado (privileged forum).66 This is a special status granted to individuals 
with high positions in the public administration. In practice, these are office holders in the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government to which only the Supreme 
Court has the power to prosecute. As the investigation unfolded, most people charged are 
related to political parties responsible for nominating and maintaining the directors of 
Petrobras.67 It is estimated that over US$2 billion were redistributed through the scheme, 
mostly to the benefit of the scheme’s operators and to politicians, mostly from PT and its 
main coalition partner, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB).
The goal of the scheme is very telling about developmental states outside East Asia. 
Moneyed influence was an effective instrument to grease the political system into buying 
political support, sustaining electoral victories of politicians in power and consolidating a 
permanent coalition that would generate institutional equilibrium. On the one hand, con-
struction companies benefitted from lucrative contracts that led them to internationalise 
and provided stable support to PT’s developmental vision. On the other hand, kickbacks 
and side payments were channelled from big private firms towards public agencies and 
political parties – a precondition for PT to keep political power intact while promoting its 
expensive industrial policy. Like structural corruption, the PT sought to create a mutual-
ly-beneficial arrangement that would mitigate regional factionalism, clientelism and patron-
age, and fragmentation resulting from Brazil’s democratic multiparty system. At the same 
time, this scheme is precisely the reason why state-led developmentalism in Brazil has lost 
its steam today.
Implications of the Brazilian case to developmental state theory
The rent-seeking scheme that began to be uncovered in the Car Wash investigation has 
important implications for the study of developmental states. To start, Brazil reaffirms the 
arguments of Kang, Wedeman and Weiss as regards the centrality of political corruption in 
generating political stability and in the formation of pro-growth coalitions. While industrial 
policy can be interpreted as the productive allocation of rents leading to state-guided 
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growth, the manner of distributing state resources is in fact mediated by money politics and 
collusion between states and big business. Perhaps more crucially, what Wedeman considers 
as developmental corruption in East Asia now appears to be more synonymous with pred-
atory corruption given that Brazil’s Car Wash scandal dramatically impacted the credibility 
of Petrobras and weakened the capacity of the state to discipline domestic firms. By early 
2015, the new management team of Petrobras announced that the scandal had cost the 
company US$17 billion, its market value was reduced by half, is burdened by a US$100 billion 
debt and had to deal with a class action suit and investigations by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice. This has led the company to cancel 
or postpone its investment plans, halting the development of the domestic oil industry.
Taking a comparative perspective, Brazil’s structural corruption resembles the process 
upon which South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia have been crippled by rent-seeking in the 
face of an economic crisis. In these countries, the developmental state became synonymous 
with crony capitalism, and the close relationship between states and big business was sud-
denly blamed as the malaise of development. The same industrial policy that fuelled the 
expansion of strategic sectors and financed state-guided high growth system began to be 
perceived as the root cause of corruption and the reason for the on-going political crisis in 
Brazil. Hence, structural or developmental corruption and wastage of state resources are 
two sides of the same coin. The question is how far such state intervention and the politici-
sation of the state apparatus can generate political stability – a precondition for high growth 
– and under what conditions rent-seeking becomes predatory and damaging to growth.
Secondly, Brazil’s industrial policy has produced mixed results, which is partly an outcome 
of the inherent flaws of its strategy and partially due to political interactions between states 
and SOEs. While corporate governance reforms were implemented in Brazil to transform 
SOEs into more efficient firms, this was ultimately not sufficient to insulate the company 
from being used as an instrument of rent-seeking of political elites. In significant ways, it 
confirms the long-standing dilemma of state capitalism: how to maintain competitive SOEs 
and internationally-oriented domestic firms while also avoiding excessive state interference 
that oftentimes reverse the benefits of development policy.
As Brazil’s Lava Jato investigation draws to a close, the costs of state interventionist policies 
and its rent-seeking tendencies are becoming clear. In a sector that was largely dependent 
on a single SOE for its expansion, Petrobras’ reduction in expenses and investment caused 
the supply chain to dramatically shrink in terms of production, employment and consequent 
reduction in consumption of goods and services, as well as tax revenues. Crucially, the effects 
of the scandal spread from the O&G to the construction sector – one of the key sectors 
directly being investigated – as well as the shipbuilding industry, which was heavily depend-
ent on Petrobras orders. As the company reduced and halted its orders, the industry imme-
diately lost its biggest market. The story of Brazil’s developmental approach reflects the 
tensions inherent in this model of growth. As we argued earlier, developmental states require 
institutional capacity and developmental vision; their success hinges on the capability of 
political elites to strike a balance between state discretion over designing industrial policy 
on the one hand and sustaining a coalitional base without turning into rent-seeking and 
clientelism. For aspiring developmental states, purposive and pragmatic state action in pur-
suit of new strategies is important, but this approach bears costs as political interventions 
can oftentimes lead to rent-seeking, and worse, the creation of predatory capitalism.
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